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Abstract—Deep Learning systems (DL) based on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are increasingly being used in various aspects of
our life, including unmanned vehicles, speech processing, intelligent robotics and etc. Due to the limited dataset and the dependence
on manually labeled data, DNNs always fail to detect erroneous behaviors. This may lead to serious problems. Several approaches
have been proposed to enhance adversarial examples for testing DL systems. However, they have the following two limitations. First,
most of them do not consider the influence of small perturbations on adversarial examples. Some approaches take into account the
perturbations, however, they design and generate adversarial examples based on special DNN models. This might hamper the
reusability on the examples in other DNN models, thus reducing their generalizability. Second, they only use shallow feature constraints
(e.g. pixel-level constraints) to judge the difference between the generated adversarial example and the original example. The deep
feature constraints, which contain high-level semantic information - such as image object category and scene semantics, are
completely neglected. To address these two problems, we propose CAGFuzz, a Coverage-guided Adversarial Generative Fuzzing
testing approach for Deep Learning Systems, which generates adversarial examples for DNN models to discover their potential
defects. First, we train an Adversarial Case Generator (AEG) based on general data sets. AEG only considers the data characteristics,
and avoids low generalization ability. Second, we extract the deep features of the original and adversarial examples, and constrain the
adversarial examples by cosine similarity to ensure that the semantic information of adversarial examples remains unchanged. Finally,
we use the adversarial examples to retrain the model. Based on three standard data sets, we design a set of dedicated experiments to
evaluate CAGFuzz. The experimental results show that CAGFuzz can improve the neuron coverage rate, detect hidden errors, and
also improve the accuracy of the target DNN.
Index Terms—deep neural network; fuzz testing; adversarial example; coverage criteria.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
NOwadays, we have already stepped into the era ofartificial intelligence from the digital era. Apps with
AI systems can be seen everywhere in our daily life, such as
Amazon Alexa [1], DeepMind’s Atari [2], and AI-phaGo [3].
With the development of edge computing, 5G technology
and etc., AI technologies become more and more mature.
In many applications, we can see the shape of deep neural
networks (DNNs), such as automatic driving [4], intelligent
robotics [5], smart city applications [6] and AI-enabled En-
terprise Information Systems [7]. In this paper, we term this
kind of applications as DL (deep learning) systems.
In particular, many different kinds of DNNs are em-
bedded in security and safety-critical applications, such
as automatic driving [4] and intelligent robotics [5]. This
brings new challenges since predictability, correctness, and
safety are especially crucial for this kind of DL systems.
These safety-critical applications deploying DNNs without
comprehensive testing could have serious problems. For
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example, in automatic driving systems, if the deployed
DNNs have not recognized the obstacles ahead timely and
correctly, it may lead to serious consequences such as vehicle
damage and even human death [8].
Generally speaking, the development process of DL sys-
tems is essentially different from the traditional software
development process. As shown in Fig. 1, for traditional
software development practices, developers directly specify
the logic of the systems. On the contrary, DL systems auto-
matically learn their models and corresponding parameters
from data. Consequently, the testing process of DL systems
is also different from traditional software systems. For tra-
ditional software systems, code or control-flow coverage is
utilized to guide the testing process [9]. However, the logic
of the DL systems is not encoded by control flow, and it can-
not be solved by the normal encoding way. Their decisions
are always made by training data for many times, and the
performance is more dependent on data rather than human
intervention. For DL systems, neural coverage can be used
to guide the testing process [10]. When faults are found, it is
also very difficult to locate the exact position in the original
DL systems. Consequently, most traditional software testing
methodologies are not suitable for testing DL systems. As
highlighted in [10], [11], research on developing new testing
techniques for DL systems is urgently needed.
The standard way to test DL systems is to collect and
manually mark as much actual test data as possible [12],
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Fig. 1. Comparison between traditional and DL system development
[13]. Obviously, it is unthinkable to exhaustively test every
feasible input of the DL systems. Recently, an increasing
number of researchers have contributed to test DL systems
with a variety of approaches [10], [11], [14], [15], [16]. The
main idea of these approaches is to enhance input examples
of test data set by different techniques. Some approaches,
e.g. DeepXplore [10], use multiple DNNs to discover and
generate adversarial examples that lie between the decision
boundaries of these DNNs. Some approaches, e.g. Deep-
Hunter [11], use metamorphic mutation strategy to generate
new test examples. Other approaches, e.g. DeepGauge [16],
propose new coverage criteria for deep neural networks.
These coverage criteria can be used as guidance for gener-
ating test examples. While state-of-the-art approaches make
some progresses on testing DL systems, they still suffer the
following two main problems:
1) DNN-dependent generation of adversarial examples.
Most approaches [11], [17] do not consider the in-
fluence of small perturbations on deep neural net-
works when the test examples are generated. Some
approaches [10], [18] consider small perturbations
based on special DNN models. The test examples
that they have generated are only designed for one
special DNN, and it may be difficult to generalize
them to other DNNs. Recent research on adversarial
DL systems [19], [20] shows that by adding the
small perturbations to existing images and elabo-
rating synthetic images can fool state-of-the-art DL
systems. Therefore, to improve the generalization
ability, it is significantly important to add small
perturbations only based on data.
2) Shallow feature constraints. State-of-the-art adversar-
ial example generation approaches use shallow fea-
ture constraints, such as pixel-level constraints, to
judge the difference between the adversarial ex-
ample and the original example. The deep feature
constraints containing high-level semantic informa-
tion, such as image object category and scene se-
mantics, are completely neglected. For example, in
their study, Xie et al. [11] use L0 and L∞ to limit
the pixel-level changes of the adversarial example.
However, such shallow feature constraints can only
represent the visual consistency between the adver-
sarial example and the original example, and cannot
guarantee the high-level semantic information con-
sistency between the adversarial example and the
original example. Furthermore, this may lead to bad
performance when testing the network with deep
layers.
To address the problems aforementioned, we propose
a new testing approach for DL systems, called CAGFuzz
(Coverage-guided Adversarial Generative Fuzzing)1. The
goal of the CAGFuzz is to maximize the neuron coverage
and generate adversarial test examples as much as possible
with small perturbations for the target DNNs. The goal of
the CAGFuzz is to maximize the neuron coverage and gen-
erate adversarial test examples with minimal perturbations
for the target DNNs. Meanwhile, the generated examples
have strong generalization ability and can be used to test
different DNN models. CAGFuzz iteratively selects the test
examples in the processing pool and generates the adversar-
ial examples through the pre-trained adversarial example
generator (see Section 3 for details) to guide DL systems to
expose incorrect behaviors. During the process of generating
adversarial examples, CAGFuzz keeps valid adversarial ex-
amples, which can provide a certain improvement in neuron
coverage for subsequent fuzzy processing, and limit the
small perturbations invisible to human eyes, ensuring the
same meaningfulness between the original example and the
adversarial example. The contributions of this paper include
the following three aspects:
• We design an adversarial example generator, AEG, which
can generate adversarial examples with small perturba-
tions based on general data sets. The goal of Cycle-
GAN [21] is to transform image A to image B with
different styles. Based on CycleGAN, our goal is to
transform image B back to image A, and get image
A’ similar to the original image A. Consequently,
we combine two generators with opposite functions
of CycleGAN as our adversarial example generator.
The adversarial examples generated by AEG can add
small perturbations invisible to human eyes to the
original examples. AEG is trained based on general
data sets and does not rely on any specific DNN
model, which has higher generalization ability than
state-of-the-art approaches. Furthermore, because of
the inherent constraint logic of CycleGAN, the trained
AEG not only has high efficiency in generating adver-
sarial examples but also can effectively improve the
robustness of DL systems.
• We extract the deep features of the original example and
the adversarial example, and make them as similar as
possible by similarity measurement. We use VGG-19 net-
work [22] to extract the deep semantic information
of the original example and the adversarial example,
and use the method of cosine similarity measurement
to ensure that the deep semantic information of the
adversarial example is consistent with the original
1. https://github.com/QXL4515/CAGFuzz
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example as much as possible. At the same time,
the deep feature constraint can make the adversarial
examples generated by CAGFuzz get better results
compared with other approaches when testing the
network with deep layers.
• We design a series of experiments to evaluate the
CAGFuzz approach based on several public data sets. The
experiments validate that CAGFuzz can effectively
improve the neuron coverage of the target DNN
model. Meanwhile, it is proved that the adversarial
examples generated by CAGFuzz can find hidden
defects in the target DNN model. Furthermore, the
accuracy and the robustness of the DNN models
retrained by AEG have been significantly improved.
For example, the accuracy of the VGG-16 [22] model
in the experiments has been improved from the
original 86.72% to 97.25%, with an improvement of
12.14%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides some basic concepts including CycleGAN,
Coverage-guided Grey-box Fuzzing (CGF). The coverage-
guided adversarial generative fuzzy testing framework is
provided in Section 3. In Section 4, we use three popular
datasets (MNIST [23], Cifar-10 [24], and ImageNet [25]) to
validate our approach. Existing work and their limitations
are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper and looks into future work.
2 PRELIMINARIES
The principles of coverage-guided grey-box fuzzing, Cycle-
GAN, and VGG-19 are introduced in Section 2.1, Section 2.2,
and Section 2.3, respectively. Section 2.4 introduces the basic
concept and calculation formula for neuron coverage.
2.1 Coverage-guided Grey-box Fuzzing
Due to the scalability and effectiveness in generating useful
defect detection tests, fuzzing has been widely used in
academia and industry. Based on the perception of the
target program structure, the fuzzy controller can be di-
vided into black-box, white-box, and grey-box. One of the
most successful techniques is Coverage-guided Grey-box
Fuzzing (CGF), which balances effectiveness and efficiency
by using code coverage as feedback. Many state-of-the-
art CGF approaches, such as AFL [26], libFuzzer [27], and
VUzzer [28], have been widely used and proved to be
effective. Smart Greybox Fuzzing (SGF) [29] has made some
improvements on CGF. Specifically, it leverages a high-level
structural representation of the original example to generate
new examples. The state-of-the-art CGF approaches mainly
consist of three parts: mutation, feedback guidance, and fuzzing
strategy:
• Mutation: According to the difference of the target ap-
plication program and data format, the correspond-
ing test data generation method is chosen and it
can use the pre-generated examples, a variation of
valid data examples, or dynamically generated ones
according to the protocol or file format.
• Feedback guidance: The fuzzy test example is executed,
and the target program is executed and monitored.
The test data that causes the exception of the target
program is recorded.
• Fuzzing strategy: If an error is detected, the corre-
sponding example is reported and new generated
examples that cover new traces are stored in the
example pool.
2.2 CycleGAN
Adversarial Example Generator (AEG) is an important part
of our approach. To improve the stability and security
for target DL systems, AEG provides effective adversarial
examples to detect potential defects. The idea of generating
adversarial examples is to add perturbations that people
cannot distinguish from the original examples; this is very
similar to the idea of GAN [30] generation of examples.
GAN’s generators G and discriminators D alternately gen-
erate adversarial examples that are very similar but not
identical to the original examples based on noise data.
Considering the difference of datasets of different target
DL systems, such as some DL systems with label data and
other DL systems may not, we choose CycleGAN [21] as
the training model of adversarial example generator, since
CycleGAN does not require the matching of data sets and
label information. CycleGAN is one of the most effective
adversarial generation approaches. The mapping function
and loss function of CycleGAN are described as follows.
• The goal of CycleGAN is to learn the mapping func-
tions between two domains X and Y . There are two
mappings G and F in the model. There are two ad-
versarial discriminators Dx and Dy, where Dx aims
to distinguish between images {x} and translated
images {F (x)}. Dy has a similar definition.
• Like other GANs, the adversarial loss function is
used to optimize the mapping function. But during
the actual training stage, it is found that the negative
log- likelihood objective is not very stable and the
loss function is changed to least-squares loss [31].
• Because of the group mapping, it is impossible to
train by using the adversarial loss function only.
The reason is that the mapping F can map all x to
a picture in Y space, consequently, CycleGAN puts
forward the cycle consistency loss.
Fig. 2 shows an example structure of CycleGAN [21]. The
purpose of this example is to transform real pictures and
Van Gogh style paintings into each other. It does not need
pairs of data to guide the adversarial generation, and has a
wide range and practicability. Therefore, in this paper, we
use CycleGAN to train our adversarial example generator,
which can effectively generate adversarial examples to test
the target DL systems.
2.3 VGG-19 Network Structure
The ability of deep feature recognition and semantic ex-
pression extracted by CNN is stronger. Consequently, it
has more advantages than traditional image features. The
structure of VGG-19 [22] convolution network is shown in
Fig. 3. There are 19 layers including 16 convolution layers,
i.e., two every Convl1-Convl2, four every Convl3-Convl5,
and three full-connection layers, Fc6, Fc7, and Fc8. The
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Fig. 2. An example demonstration of CycleGAN. (a) transform the real
picture into Van Gogh style painting; (b) transform Van Gogh style
painting into the real pictures.
works in [32], [33] show that the VGG-19 network can
extract high-level semantic information from images, and
it can be used to identify similarities between images. In
this paper, the output of the last full connection layer is
fused as feature vector to compare the similarity between
the adversarial examples and the original examples, and to
serve as the threshold for filtering the generated adversarial
examples.
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2.4 Neuron Coverage
Pei et al. [10] propose for the first time neuron coverage as a
measure of testing DL. They define neuron coverage of a set
of test inputs as the ratio of the number of unique activated
neurons in all test inputs to the total number of neurons in
the DNN.
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Fig. 4. Coverage-Guided Adversarial Generative Fuzzing Testing Ap-
proach
Let N = {n1, n2, ..., np} be the set of all neurons in
the DNN, where p is the length of neurons. The input to
a DNN is an image xi ∈ T = {x1, x2, ..., xq}, where T is the
input domain and q is the length of the input domain. Let
out(ni, xi) be an output function that returns the output
value of a neuron ni in DNN for a given test input xi.
Finally, let t represent the threshold for considering a neuron
to be activated. Then, the neuron coverage can be defined in
the following:
NC(T, x) =
|{n|∀x ∈ T, out(n, x) > t}|
|N | (1)
3 COVERAGE-GUIDED ADVERSARIAL GENERA-
TIVE FUZZING TESTING APPROACH
In this section, we first give an overview of our approach
(Section 3.1), and then we describe the pre-treatment of
our approach in Section 3.2, including data collection and
AEG training. Section 3.3 describes the algorithm of the
adversarial example generation process. Finally, Section 3.4
shows how our approach uses neuron coverage feedback to
guide the generation of new adversarial examples.
3.1 Overview
The core component of DL systems is the Deep Neural Net-
work (DNN) with different structures and parameters. In
the following discussions, we will study how to test DNNs.
The input formats of DNNs can be various. In this paper,
we focus on DNNs that take pictures as input. Adding
perturbations to images has a great impact on DNNs and
may cause errors. Guided by neuron coverage, the quality
of the generated adversarial examples can be improved. As
anticipated before, this paper presents CAGFuzz, a coverage-
guided adversarial generative fuzzing testing approach.
This approach generates adversarial examples with invisible
perturbations based on AEG. In general, Fig. 4 shows the
main process of our approach, which consists of three parts,
described as follows:
• The first step is the data collection and training adver-
sarial example generator. For each data set, the data
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sets are divided into two subsets and as the input of
CycleGAN to train AEG. These examples are then put
into the processing pool after priority is set according
to storage time. We use this processing pool as the
initial input for fuzzy testing.
• The second step is the adversarial example generation.
Each time a prioritized raw example is selected from
the processing pool and used as the input of AEG to
generate adversarial examples. Using deep feature
constraint to determine which adversarial examples
should be saved. First, we use the VGG-19 network
to extract the deep features (see Section 3.3.2) of the
original and adversarial examples. Then, we calcu-
late the cosine similarity (see Section 3.3.3) between
the deep features of the original and the adversarial
examples. If the cosine similarity between the two
deep features is more than 0.9, we assume that the
adversarial example is consistent with the original
example in deep semantics and can be saved.
• The third step is to use neuron coverage to guide
the generation process. The adversarial examples
generated in the second step is given as input to
the DNN under test for coverage analysis. If a new
coverage occurs, the adversarial example will be put
into the processing pool as part of the dataset. The
new coverage means that the neuron coverage of
the adversarial example is higher than the neuron
coverage of the original example.
The main flow chart of the CAGFuzz approach is shown
in Algorithm 1. The input of CAGFuzz includes a target
Dataset (D), a deep neural network DNN (DNN ), the num-
ber of maximum iterations N , the number of adversarial
examples N1 generated by each original example, and the
parameter K of top-k. The output is the generated test
example that improves the coverage of the target DNN.
Before the whole fuzzing process, we need to process
the dataset. On the one hand, the dataset is divided into
two equal data fields (Line 1) to train adversarial example
generator AEG(Line 2). On the other hand, all examples
are pre-processed (Line 3) and stored in the processing
pool (Line 4). During each iteration process (Line 5), the
original example parent is selected from the processing pool
according to the time priority (Lines 6- 7). Then, each orig-
inal example parent is generated many times (Line 8). For
each generation, the adversarial example generator AEG is
used to mutate the original example parent to generate the
adversarial example data (Line 9). The deep features of the
original example parent and the adversarial example data
are extracted separately, and the cosine similarity (Lines 10-
11) between them is calculated. Finally, all the adversarial
examples generated by original example are sorted from
high to low in similarity, and top-k of them are selected
as the target examples (Line 13). Calculating the neuron
coverage of the top-k adversarial examples and feedback
these coverage to determine whether the adversarial exam-
ple is saved (Line 15). If the adversarial examples increase
the coverage of the target DNN, they will be stored in the
processing pool and set a time priority (Lines 16- 19). The
content of time priority is in Section 3.3.1.
Algorithm 1 A description of the main loop of CAGFuzz
Input: D: Corresponding data sets,
DNN : Target Deep Neural Network,
N : The number of maximum iteration,
N1: Number of new examples generated,
K : Top-k parameter
Output: Test Example Set for Increasing Coverage
1: X,Y = Divide(D);
2: Train AEG through X and Y
3: T = Preprocessing(D);
4: The preprocessed dataset T serves as the initial process-
ing pool
5: while number of iterations < N do
6: S = HeuristicSelect(T );
7: parent = Sample(S);
8: while number of generation < N1 do
9: data = AEG(parent);
10: Fp, Fd = FeatureExtraction(parent,data);
11: Similarity = CosineSimilarity(Fp,Fd);
12: end while
13: Selecting top-k examples from all new examples;
14: while number of calculation < K do
15: cov = DNNFeed(data);
16: if IsNewCoverage(cov) then
17: Add data to processing pool
18: Setting time priority for data;
19: end if
20: end while
21: end while
22: Output all examples in the processing pool as a test
example set;
3.2 Data Collection and Training AEG
3.2.1 Data Collection
We define the target task of CAGFuzz as an image classifi-
cation problem. Image classification is the core module of
most existing DL systems. The first step of CAGFuzz is to
choose the image classification DNN (e.g. LeNet-1, 4, 5) to
be tested and the dataset to be classified. The operation of
the dataset is divided into two parts. First, all the examples
in the dataset are prioritized, and then all the examples
are stored in the processing pool as the original example.
During the process of fuzzing, the fuzzer selects the original
example from the processing pool according to the priority
to perform the fuzzing operation. Second, the dataset is
divided into two uniform groups. According to the domain,
it is used as the input of the cycle generative adversarial
network to train the adversarial example generator.
3.2.2 Training Adversarial Example Generator
Traditional fuzzers mutate the original examples by flipping
bits/bytes, cross-input files and swap blocks to achieve the
effect of fuzziness. However, mutation of DNN input using
these methods is not achievable or invalid, and may produce
a large number of invalid and/or non-semantic testing
examples. At the same time, how to grasp the degree of
mutation is also a question for us to think about. If mutation
changes very little, the newly generated examples may be
almost unchanged. Although this may be meaningful, the
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DX
as close as possible
Fig. 5. Transformation relationship between two mapping functions in
training AEG.
possibility of new examples finding DNN errors is very low.
On the other hand, if the mutation changes greatly, more
defects of DNN may be found. However, the semantics
gap between the new generated example and the original
example may be also large, that is to say, the new generated
example is also invalid.
We propose a new strategy that uses adversarial example
generator as mutations. Given an image example x, AEG
generates an adversarial example x′, and the deep semantics
information of x′ is consistent with that of x, but the adver-
sarial perturbations that cannot be observed by human eyes
are added. We invert the idea of CycleGAN, add adversarial
perturbations to the original example by adversarial loss,
and control the perturbations to be invisible to human eyes
by cyclic consistency loss.
In Section 3.2.1, we propose to divide the collected data
into two groups of data domains evenly. We define these
two data domains as data domain X and data domain
Y . Our goal is to use the two data domains as input of
the CycleGAN, and to learn mapping functions from each
other between the two data domains to train the AEG.
Supposing that the set of data domain X is represented
as {x1, x2, ..., xn}, where xi denotes a training example in
data domain X . Similarly, the set of data domain Y denotes
{y1, y2, ..., ym}, where yi represents a training example in
data domain Y . We define the data distribution of two
groups of data domains, where the data domain X is
expressed as x ∼ Pdata(x), and data domain Y is expressed
as y ∼ Pdata(y). As shown in Fig. 5, the mapping functions
between two sets of data domains are defined as P : X → Y
and Q : Y → X , where P represents the transformation
from data domain X to data domain Y , and Q represents
the transformation from data domain Y to data domain X .
In addition, there are two adversarial discriminators DX
and DY . DX distinguishes the original example x of data
domain X from the one generated by mapping function Q.
Similarly, DY distinguishes the original example y of data
domain Y from the adversarial example P (x) generated by
mapping function P .
Adversarial Loss. The mapping function between two sets
of data domains is designed with loss function. For mapping
function P and corresponding adversarial discriminator
DY , the objective function is defined as follows:
min
P
max
D
Y V (P,DY , X, Y ) = Ey∼Pdata(y)[logDY (y)]+
Ex∼Pdata(x)[log(1−DY (P (x)))]
(2)
The function of mapping function P is to generate adver-
sarial examples y′ = P (x) similar to data domain Y , which
can be understood as adding large perturbations with Y
characteristics of data domain to the original example x of
data domain X . At the same time, there is an adversarial
discriminator DY to distinguish the real examples y in
data domain Y and the generated adversarial example Y ′.
The objective of the objective function is to minimize the
mapping function P and maximize the adversarial discrim-
inator DY . Similarly, for the mapping function Q and the
target function set by the adversarial discriminator DX , the
objective function is defined in the following:
min
Q
max
D
XV (Q,DX , Y,X) = Ex∼Pdata(x)[logDX(x)]+
Ey∼Pdata(y)[log(1−DX(Q(y)))]
(3)
Cycle Consistency Loss. We can add perturbations to the
original example by using the aforementioned adversarial
loss function, but the degree of mutation of this perturbation
is large, and it is prone to generate invalid adversarial
examples. To avoid this problem, we add constraints to the
perturbations, and control the degree of mutation through
the cycle consistency loss. In this way, the perturbation-
resistant human eyes added to the original example are
invisible. For example, example x of data domain X is
generated by mapping function P to generate adversarial
example y′, and then adversarial example y′ is generated
by mapping function Q to generate new adversarial ex-
ample x′. At this time, the generated adversarial example
x′ is similar to the original example x, that is to say,
x → P (x) = y′ → Q(y′) = x′ ≈ x. The objective function
of the loss function of cyclic consistency is described as
follows:
Losscycle(P,Q) = Ex∼Pdata(x)[||Q(P (x)− x||1]+
Ey∼Pdata(y)[||P (Q(y)− y||1]
(4)
The overall structure of the network has two generators:
P and Q, and two discriminator networks DX and DY . The
whole network is a dual structure. We combine two gener-
ators with opposite functions into our adversarial example
generator. The effect picture of AEG is shown in Fig. 6, we
show that the adversarial example generation process has
12 groups of pictures of different categories. In each picture,
the leftmost column is the original example, the middle
column is the transformed example of the original example,
and the rightmost column is the reconstructed example.
We choose the reconstructed example as the adversarial
example. First, larger perturbations are added to the orig-
inal example. Second, the degree of mutation is controlled
by reverse reconstruction to generate adversarial examples
with smaller perturbations.
3.3 Adversarial Example Generation
3.3.1 Example Priority
The priority of the example determines which kind of exam-
ples should be selected next time. We choose a probabilistic
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(a) automobile and truck (b) airplane and bird (c) frog and ship
(d) horse and deer (e) dog and cat (f) apple and orange
Fig. 6. AEG generates effect maps of adversarial examples. In each picture, the leftmost column is the original example, the middle column is the
transformed example of the original example, and the rightmost column is the reconstructed example.
selection strategy based on the time of adding examples to
the processing pool. We adopt a meta-heuristic formula with
faster selection speed. The probability calculation formula
is described as follows: h(bi, t) = e
ti−t∑
eti−t , where h(bi, t)
represents the probability of selecting example bi at time
t, and ti represents the time when example bi joins the
processing pool.
This priority can be understood as follows: the most
recently sampled examples are more likely to generate
useful new neuron coverage when mutating to adversarial
examples. However, when time passes, the advantage will
gradually diminish.
3.3.2 Deep Feature
To ensure the meaning of the generated adversarial exam-
ples as much as possible, we adopt the strategy of extracting
the semantics features of the original examples and ad-
versarial examples and controlling their differences within
a certain range. The deep feature recognition ability and
semantics expression ability extracted by CNN are stronger.
Consequently, we select the VGG-19 network to extract the
deep features of examples. The deep features in the VGG-19
model are extracted according to the hierarchy. Compared
with the high-level features, the low-level features are un-
likely to contain rich semantics information.
The deep features extracted from the VGG-19 network
model can represent images better than traditional image
features. It also shows that the deeper the layer of convolu-
tion network, the more parameters in the network, and the
better the image can be expressed. We fuse the output of the
last full connection layer (Fc8 layer in Fig. 3) as deep feature,
and the dimension of deep feature is 4096.
3.3.3 Cosine Similarity Computation
During the mutation process, AEG generates multiple ad-
versarial examples for each original example. We assume
that the original example is a, and the set of all adversarial
examples is T = {a1, a2, ..., an}, which extracts the seman-
tics feature vectors for the original example and all the
confrontational examples by the feature extraction method
mentioned above. The dimension of each feature vector is
4096. Supposing that the feature vector corresponding to
the original example a is X = [x1, x2, ..., xn]n=4096, and the
corresponding eigenvector of an adversarial example is ai
is Y = [y1, y2, ..., yn]n=4096, where ai ∈ T . Cosine similarity
is used to measure the difference between each adversarial
example and the original example. The formula is described
as follows:
COS(X,Y ) =
X · Y
||X|| × ||Y || =
∑n
i=1(xi × yi)√∑n
i=1 x
2
i ×
√∑n
i=1 y
2
i
(5)
where xi and yi correspond to each dimension of eigenvec-
tor X and Y .
To control the size and improve the mutation quality
of adversarial examples, we select the top-k adversarial
examples sorted from high to low cosine similarity as
eligible examples to continue the follow-up steps. In our
approach, we set K = 5, that is to say, we select the five
adversarial examples with the highest cosine similarity for
neuron coverage.
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3.4 DNN Feedback
Without coverage as a guiding condition, the adversarial
examples generated by AEG are not purposeful. Conse-
quently it is impossible to know whether the adversarial
examples are effective or not. If the generated adversarial
examples cannot bring new coverage information to the
DNN to be tested, these adversarial examples can only
simply expand the dataset, but cannot effectively detect the
potential defects of DNN. To make matters worse, mutations
in these adversarial examples may bury other meaningful
examples in a fuzzy queue, thus significantly reducing
the fuzzing effect. Therefore, neuron coverage feedback is
used to determine whether the newly generated adversarial
examples should be placed in the processing pool for further
mutation.
After each round of generation and similarity screening,
all valid adversarial examples are used as the input of DNN
to be tested for neuron coverage analysis. If the adversarial
examples generate new neuron coverage information, we
will set priority for the adversarial examples and store it
in the processing pool for further mutation. For example,
a DNN for image classification consists of 100 neurons. 32
neurons are activated when the original example is input
into the network, and 35 neurons are activated when the ad-
versarial example is input into the network. Consequently,
we say that the adversarial example brings new coverage
information.
4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we perform a set of dedicated experiments
to validate CAGFuzz. Section 4.1 proposes the research
questions. Section 4.2 describes the experimental design.
Section 4.3 provides the experimental results and Section 4.4
discusses some threats to validity.
4.1 Research Questions
We use three standard deep learning datasets and the corre-
sponding image classification models to carry out a series
of experiments to validate CAGFuzz. The purpose of the
experiments is designed to explore the following four main
research questions:
• RQ1: Could the generated adversarial examples
based on data have stronger generalization ability
than those based on models?
• RQ2: Could CAGFuzz improve the neuron coverage
in the target network?
• RQ3: Could CAGFuzz find potential defects in the
target network?
• RQ4: Could the accuracy and the robustness of the
target network be improved by adding adversarial
examples to the training set?
To discover potential defects of target network and
expand effective examples for data sets, the CAGFuzz ap-
proach mainly generates adversarial examples for DNNs to
be tested. Therefore, we designed RQ1 to explore whether
the examples generated based on data have better gener-
alization ability than those based on models. For neuron
coverage, we designed RQ2 to explore whether CAGFuzz
can effectively generate test examples with more coverage
information for target DNNs. We designed RQ3 to study
whether CAGFuzz can discover more hidden defects in tar-
get DNNs. RQ4 is designed to explore whether adding the
adversarial examples generated by CAGFuzz to the training
set can significantly improve the accuracy of target DNNs.
4.2 Experimental Design
4.2.1 Experimental Environment
The experiments have been performed on Linux machines.
The detailed descriptions of the hardware and software
environments of the experiments are shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Experimental hardware and software environment
Name Standard
CPU Xeon Silver 4108
GPU NVIDIA Quadro P4000
RAM 32G
System Ubuntu 16.04
Programming environment Python
Deep learning open source
framework
Tensorflow1.12
4.2.2 DataSets and Corresponding DNN Models
For research purpose, we adopt three popular and
commonly used datasets with different types of data:
MNIST [23], CIFAR-10 [24], and ImageNet [25]. At the same
time, we have learned and trained several popular DNN
models for each dataset, which have been widely used
by scientific researchers. In Table 2, we provide an infor-
mative summary of these datasets and the corresponding
DNN models. All the evaluated DNN models are either
pre-trained (i.e., we use the common weights in previous
researchers’ papers) or trained according to standards by
using common datasets and public network structures.
MNIST [23] is a large handwritten digital dataset con-
taining 28 ∗ 28 ∗ 1 pixels of images with class labels ranging
from 0 to 9. The dataset contains 60,000 training examples
and 10,000 test examples. We construct three different kinds
of neural networks based on LeNet family, namely LeNet-1,
LeNet-4, and LeNet-5.
CIFAR-10 [24] is a set of general image classification
images, including 32 ∗ 32 ∗ 3 pixel three-channel images,
including ten different kinds of pictures (such as aircraft,
cats, trucks, etc.). The dataset contains 50,000 training ex-
amples and 10,000 test examples. Due to the large amount
of data and high complexity of CIFAR-10, its classification
task is more difficult than MNIST. To obtain the competitive
performance of CIFAR-10, we choose three famous DNN
models VGG-16, VGG-19, and ResNet-20 as the targeted
models.
ImageNet [25] is a large image dataset, in which each
image is a 224 ∗ 224 ∗ 3 three-channel image, containing
1000 different types. The dataset contains a large number of
training data (more than one million) and test data (about
50,000). Therefore, for any automated testing tool, working
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on ImageNet-sized datasets and DNN models is a severe
test. Because the large number of images in the ImageNet
dataset, most state-of-the-art adversarial approaches are
only evaluated on a part of the ImageNet dataset. To obtain
the competitive performance of ImageNet, we choose three
famous DNN models VGG-16, VGG-19, and ResNet-50 as
the targeted models.
TABLE 2
Subject datasets and DNN models
DataSet DataSet
Descrip-
tion
Model #Layer #Neuron Test
acc(%)
MNIST
Hand written
digits from 0
to 9
LeNet-1 7 52 98.25
LeNet-4 8 148 98.75
LeNet-5 9 268 98.63
CIFAR-10 10 classgeneral image
VGG-16 16 19540 86.84
VGG-19 19 41118 77.26
ResNet-20 70 4861 82.86
ImageNet
1000-class
large scale
datasets
VGG-16 16 14888 92.6
VGG-19 19 16168 92.7
ResNet-50 176 94059 96.43
4.2.3 Contrast Approaches
As surveyed in [34], there are several open-source tools in
testing machine learning applications. Some released tools,
such as Themis 2, mltest 3, and torchtes 4 do not focus on gen-
erating adversarial examples. Thus, to measure the ability
of CAGFuzz, we selected the following three representative
DL testing approaches proposed recently in the literature as
our contrast approaches, respectively:
• FGSM [18] (Fast Gradient Sign Method) - a typical
approach generates adversarial examples based on
model. Consequently, we use FGSM to generate ad-
versarial examples to compare with CAGFuzz, and
verify that the generated adversarial examples based
on pure data have higher generalization ability than
those based on models.
• DeepHunter [11] - an automated fuzz testing frame-
work for hunting potential defects of general-
purpose DNNs. DeepHunter performs metamorphic
mutation to generate new semantically preserved
tests, and leverages multiple plug-able coverage cri-
teria as feedback to guide the test generation from
different perspectives.
• DeepXplore [10] - the first white box system for
systematically testing DL systems and automatically
identify erroneous behaviors without manual labels.
DeepXplore performs gradient ascent to solve a joint
optimization problem that maximizes both neuron
coverage and the number of potentially erroneous
behaviors.
Since there is no open source version of DeepHunter [11],
we have implemented eight image transformation methods
mentioned in DeepHunter, and we use these eight methods
2. http://fairness.cs.umass.edu/
3. https://github.com/Thenerdstation/mltest
4. https://github.com/suriyadeepan/torchtest
to replace DeepHunter for later experimental evaluation. The
source code of FGSM and DeepXplore can be found on
GitHub, and the tools are utilized for later experimental
evaluation.
4.3 Experimental Results
4.3.1 Training of Target DNNs
To ensure the correctness and validate the evaluation results
of the experiments, we carefully select several popular DNN
models with competitive performance for each dataset.
These DNN models have been proven to be standard in pre-
vious researchers’ experiments. In our approach, we closely
follow the common machine learning training practices and
guidelines, and set the learning rate for training DNN
model. During the initialization process of DNN model
learning rate, if the learning rate is too high, the weight of
the model will increase rapidly, which will have a negative
impact on the training of the whole model. Consequently,
the learning rate is set to a smaller value at the beginning.
For the three LeNet models of the MNIST dataset, we set
the learning rate as 0.05.
For the two VGG networks of the CIFAR-10 dataset, we
set the initial learning rate as 0.0005 based on experiences
because of the deeper network layers and the more complex
model. In addition, we initially set the epoch for each
model as 100 training times. The LeNet model works well,
but when we train the VGG-16 network, we find that the
accuracy of the model is basically stable after 50 training
epochs, as shown in Fig. 7. Therefore, during the process of
training the VGG-19 network and the subsequent retraining
model stage, we reset the training epochs to 50; this can save
a lot of computing resources and space-time costs. During
the process of training the ResNet-20 model, we set up a
three-stage adaptive learning rate. When epoch < 20, we
set the learning rate as 1e−3. When 20 < epoch < 50, we
set the learning rate as 1e−4. When epoch > 50, we set the
learning rate as 1e−5.
For the VGG-16, VGG-19, and ResNet-50 models used to
classify the ImageNet data sets, we directly used the model
with ImageNet as the data set in the keras framework [35],
since it has already trained and achieved enough perfor-
mance. The Imagenet data set is too large (including 137 GB
training set, 12.7 GB test set, and 6.28 GB verification set),
the cost of retraining model is too large, and the general
hardware equipment cannot meet the requirements. There-
fore, for the ImageNet data set, we only have performed
experiments on the two modules (Neuron Coverage and
Error Behavior Discovery).
In Fig. 8, we show the training loss, training accuracy,
validation loss, and validation accuracy of each model. As
can be seen in the figure, during the training process of
LeNet-5, with the increase of training times, the loss value of
the model gradually decreases, and the accuracy is getting
higher and higher. This shows that with the increase of
training time, the model can fit the data well, and the model
can accurately classify the dataset. We follow the criterion
of machine learning, and then choose the competitive DNN
models as the research object for the fuzzy test under the
condition of fitting.
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Fig. 7. Sketch of VGG-16 network training accuracy and verification
accuracy change with training epoch
4.3.2 Generalization Ability
To answer RQ1, we compare CAGFuzz with the existing
model-based approach FGSM. In the experiment, we en-
hanced FGSM by adding the coverage feedback to the
generated adversarial examples. In this way, FGSM has
the same coverage-guided test approach as CAGFuzz. We
choose MNIST and CIFAR-10 data sets as the sampling
set. For MNIST, we sample 10 examples for each class in
the training set and 4 examples for each class in the test
set. Since the DNN models used to classify CIFAR-10 data
set have a large scale of weight parameters, 10 training
examples are not enough to achieve the training effect.
Therefore, for CIFAR-10, we sample 100 examples for each
class in the training set and 10 examples for each class in the
test set.
Based on the LeNet-1 model, we use FGSM to generate
an adversarial example for each of the 10 examples in the
training set, and also use AEG to generate an adversarial
example for each training example. First, the original data
set is used to train and test the LeNet-1 model. We set
the epoch as 50 and the learning rate as 0.05. Then, the
adversarial examples generated by CAGFuzz and FGSM are
added to the training set to retrain LeNet-1 with the same
parameters. Finally, the above two steps are repeated, but
the model is replaced by LeNet-4 or LeNet-5.
Similar to generating adversarial examples based on
LeNet-1, we perform the same experiment on LeNet-4 and
LeNet-5. Because of the uncertainty during the model train-
ing process, we train the model repeatedly 5 times in the
same setting, and take the average of these results as the
final accuracy of our experiments. For example, the 5 times
accuracy of the ResNet-20 model under FGSM-R20 fluctu-
ates; therefore, we take the average value. Table 3 shows the
accuracy of the three models on the original data set, FGSM-
Le1, FGSM-Le4, FGSM-Le5 and CAGFuzz-dataset. Among
them, “FGSM-Le1” refers to the data set generated by FGSM
method. ”CAGFuzz-dataset” refers to the data set generated
based on CAGFuzz. From the table, it can be seen that the
accuracy of the adversarial examples generated by FGSM
based on a specific model is improved higher than that of
other models. For example, after retraining LeNet-1 based
on FGSM-Le1, the accuracy is 70.6%. After retraining LeNet-
1 based on FGSM-Le4 and FGSM-Le5, the accuracy is 66.6%
and 68.6%. Analyzing all data in the Table 3, we can see that
after retraining three models based on CAGFuzz-dataset,
the accuracy of the models are all high, namely, 72.6%, 72%
and 74.3%. In the same way, similar results are obtained
when applied to the CIFAR10 data set, and the final results
are shown in Table 4. We can see that after retraining three
models based on CAGFuzz-dataset, the accuracy of the
model is mostly higher than the maximum accuracy of the
retraining model based on FGSM. In the ResNet-20 model,
the final accuracy of CAGFuzz retraining model is 39.2%,
which is a little worse than FGSM-R20, but much better than
FGSM-V16 and FGSM-V19.
 Answer to RQ1: Taking the MNIST and CIFAR-10
data sets as examples, we prove that the adversarial ex-
amples generated based on target model (such as FGSM)
only improve the accuracy of this special model better,
and the improvement on other models is limited. On the
contrary, CAGFuzz can generate adversarial examples based
on data, and this can improve the accuracy of all the models
to almost the same degree. Summarizing, the adversarial
examples generated based on CAGFuzz has better genera-
tion ability of the adversarial examples generated based on
target model.
TABLE 3
The accuracy of the three models on the MNIST data set, adversarial
examples generated based on FGSM and adversarial examples
generated based on CAGFuzz(%)
Model Orig.
dataset
FGSM-
Le1
FGSM-
Le4
FGSM-
Le5
CAGFuzz-
dataset
LeNet1 59 70.6 66.6 68.6 72.6
LeNet4 62.6 66.6 71.6 68.2 72
LeNet5 60.6 69.3 64.6 71 74.3
TABLE 4
The accuracy of the three models on the CIFAR10 data set, adversarial
examples generated based on FGSM and adversarial examples
generated based on CAGFuzz(%)
Model Orig.
dataset
FGSM-
V16
FGSM-
V19
FGSM-
R20
CAGFuzz-
dataset
VGG16 19 28.2 21.8 24 30.2
VGG19 10 18.4 25.6 21.4 27
ResNet20 15 33.8 36.8 40 39.2
4.3.3 Neuron Coverage
To answer RQ2, we use the training data set of each model
as the input set to calculate the original neural coverage,
and the generated adversarial example set as the input set
to calculate the neural coverage of CAGFuzz.
Obviously, the adversarial examples generated by AEG
can effectively improve the neuron coverage of the target
DNNs. To further validate the effectiveness of CAGFuzz
in improving neuron coverage, we also compare it with
other three approaches. Table 5 lists the original neuron
coverage of each model and the neuron coverage using
the different approaches. It can be seen from the table
that in the MNIST data set, the FGSM approach does not
improve the coverage of the model. For the LeNet-1 and
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Fig. 8. Model training record diagram:(a) LeNet-1, training on MINIST Data Set, when epoch=100, (b) LeNet-4, training on MINIST Data Set, when
epoch=100, (c)LeNet-5, training on MINIST Data Set, when epoch=100, (d)VGG-16, training on CIFAR-10 Data Set, when epoch=100, (e)VGG-19,
training on CIFAR-10 Data Set, when epoch=50, (f)ResNet-20, training on CIFAR-10 Data Set, when epoch=100.
LeNet-4 models, the coverage improvement of CAGFuzz is
not better than DeepHunter and DeepXplore. However, the
coverage improvement effect of CAGFuzz in the LeNet-5
model is obvious better than the other two approaches. In
the CIFAR-10 data set, the coverage improvement of the
FGSM approach is also not good, and even worse than the
coverage of the original examples. The coverage improve-
ment of CAGFuzz is generally better than other approaches,
in addition to the ResNet-20 model, DeepHunter increases
the coverage to 78.62%, while CAGFuzz only increases to
75.74%. In the ImageNet data set, CAGFuzz can improve the
model coverage better than all other approaches.
 Answer to RQ2: In conclusion, CAGFuzz can effec-
tively generate adversarial examples and these adversarial
examples can improve neuron coverage for the target DNN.
Due to the deep feature constraint, the adversarial examples
generated by CAGFuzz can significantly improve the neuron
coverage in the model with deep depth and large number
of neurons.
4.3.4 Error Behavior Discovery
To answer RQ3, we sample correctly classified examples
by DNN models from the test set of each dataset. Based
on these correctly classified examples, we generated adver-
sarial examples for each example through the AEG of each
dataset. The examples we selected are all positive examples
with correct classification. We can confirm that all the gener-
ated adversarial examples should also be classified correctly,
because the deep semantics information of the adversarial
examples and the original examples are consistent. The
TABLE 5
Comparison of CAGFuzz, FGSM [18], DeepHunter [11] and
DeepXplore [10] in Increasing the Neuron Coverage of Target DNNs.
DNN
Model
Orig.
NC(%)
FGSM
NC(%)
DeepHunter
NC(%)
DeepXplore
NC(%)
CAGFuzz
NC(%)
LeNet1 38.46 38.46 53.84 57.69 46.15
LeNet4 72.41 72.41 80.17 81.89 79.31
LeNet5 86.44 86.44 88.98 87.28 93.22
VGG16 50.99 47.30 59.71 55.39 62.32
VGG19 55.33 55.47 57.34 56.02 58.51
ResNet20 75.04 75.33 78.62 75.37 75.74
VGG16 13.33 13.91 14.07 13.68 14.54
VGG19 13.98 14.74 15.24 14.01 16.36
ResNet50 76.88 77.28 76.44 77.96 78.26
“positive examples” generated by AEG are input into the
corresponding classifier model for classification. If there are
errors or classification errors, a potential defect of the classi-
fication model can be found. We define the original correct
example as Imageorig and the corresponding adversarial
example as Imageadv = {Image1, Image2, ..., Image10}.
The original example Imageorig is classified correctly in
the target DNN model, consequently Imagei should also
be classified correctly, where Imagei ∈ Imageadv . If the
Imagei classification of an adversarial example is wrong,
we consider this to be an error behavior of the target DNN.
We choose a quantitative measure to evaluate the ef-
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Fig. 9. Improvement of accuracy and robustness after retraining model.
fectiveness of CAGFuzz in detecting erroneous behaviors
in different models. As mentioned above, we take 2000
examples, which are verified to be correct from each data
set. Then we use the four approaches mentioned to mutation
these examples, and generate 2000 adversarial examples for
our experiments. Table 6 shows the number of erroneous
behaviors found by different datasets under the guidance
of neuron coverage. In addition, we also list the number
of errors found by FGSM [18], DeepHunter [11], and DeepX-
plore [10] in each data set.
TABLE 6
Number of erroneous behaviors reported by FGSM [18],
DeepHunter [11], DeepXplore [10], and CAGFuzz across 2000
adversarial examples.
Data Sets FGSM DeepHunter DeepXplore CAGFuzz
MNIST 162 670 34 894
CIFAR-10 69 193 20 284
ImageNet 278 456 18 720
SUM 509 1319 72 1898
As can be seen from Table 6, the DeepXplore’s ability to
detect potential errors is poor, and its performance in each
data set is not ideal. The total number of potential errors
found in the three data sets is 72. Compared with the other
three approaches, CAGFuzz has a stronger ability on finding
potential errors in the model. It has good results in all the
three datasets, and a total of 1898 potential errors in the
model have been found.
 Answer to RQ3: With neuron coverage guided adver-
sarial examples, and based on the same model and the same
positive examples, CAGFuzz can find more potential errors
in the model.
4.3.5 Accuracy and Robustness
To answer RQ4, we add adversarial examples generated by
CAGFuzz to the training set to retrain the DNN model and
measure whether it can improve the accuracy of the target
DNN. We select the MNIST and CIAR-10 data sets as our
experimental data sets, and we select three DNN models,
LeNet-1, 4, 5, and the VGG-16, VGG-19, and ResNet-20
models as experimental models. We retrain the DNN model
by mixing 65% of the adversarial example set and the
original training set, and then validate the DNN model with
the remaining 35% of the adversarial example set and the
original test set on the original model and the retraining
model. Because of the limitation of the size of the picture,
in Fig. 9, we abbreviate the model name. For example, the
model LeNet-1 is abbreviated to Le1, the model VGG-16 is
abbreviated to V16, and the model ResNet20 is abbreviated
to R20. In Fig. 9, “test acc” represents the accuracy of the
model on the original test set, “test+adver acc” represents
the accuracy of the model on the test set with adversarial ex-
amples (the model is still the original one), and “retrain acc”
represents the accuracy of the model after retraining the
model with the adversarial examples. It can be seen from
the comparison of “test acc” and “test+adver acc” that the
robustness of the original model is very poor. After adver-
sarial examples are added into the test set, the accuracy of
the model decreases obviously. For example, the accuracy
of the LeNet-5 model decreases from 98.63% to 93.02% and
from 5.69% on the original basis. In the VGG-19 model, the
accuracy of the model decreases from 77.26% to 75.86%. The
comparison of “test acc” and “retrain acc” shows that the
accuracy of the models has been greatly improved after re-
training the model with the adversarial examples, especially
for the VGG model with deeper layers. For example, from
Fig. 9, we can see that the accuracy of the VGG-19 network
has increased from 77.26% to 95.96%, with an increase of
24.2%. In general, we can see that CAGFuzz can not only
improve the robustness of the model, but also improve the
accuracy of the model, especially for the model with deeper
network layer.
In the experiments, we further analyze the accuracy of
the retraining model and the original model during the
training process, and evaluate the validity of the adversarial
examples generated by CAGFuzz from the change of the
validation accuracy. Fig. 10 shows the changes of validation
accuracy of different models during training. The original
structure parameters and learning rate of each model are
kept unchanged, and the new data set we reconstituted is
used for retraining. During the training process, the vali-
dation accuracy and the original validation accuracy of the
same epoch are compared. It can be found that under the
same epoch, the validation accuracy of the retraining model
is higher than that of the original model, and the conver-
gence speed of the retraining model is faster. Moreover, it
can also be found from the figure that the retraining model
is more stable and has a smaller change range during the
training process.
In addition, we can see that the trend of the retrained
model is basically consistent with the original model, which
shows that the accuracy of the model can be greatly im-
proved without affecting the internal structure and logic of
the model. For example, in Fig. 10(d), the accuracy of the
original model drops suddenly when epoch = 6, and the
retraining model also continues this change. In Fig. 10(f),
the original model presents a three-stage upgrade, which is
reflected in the retraining model at the same time.
To further validate our approach, we pre-train models on
the MNIST and CIFAR-10 data sets. We further expand the
training data by adding the same number of new generated
examples, and train DNNs by 5 epochs. Our experiment re-
sults shown in Fig. 11 are compared with other approaches.
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Fig. 10. Validation Set Accuracy Contrast Diagram of Each Model in the Training Process: (a) LeNet-1, training on MINIST Data Set, when epoch=50,
(b) LeNet-4, training on MINIST Data Set, when epoch=50, (c) LeNet-5, training on MINIST Data Set, when epoch=50, (d) VGG-16, training on
CIFAR-10 Data Set, when epoch=50, (e)VGG-19, training on CIFAR-10 Data Set, when epoch=50, (f)ResNet-20, training on CIFAR-10 Data Set,
when epoch=70.
It can be found that CAGFuzz sometimes has a low initial
accuracy when the model is retrained. With the increase
of epochs, the accuracy of the model increases rapidly, and
the final accuracy for CAGFuzz is higher than that of other
approaches.
 Answer to RQ4: The accuracy of a DNN can be im-
proved by retraining the DNN with adversarial examples
generated by CAGFuzz. The accuracy of the best model
is improved from the original 86.72% to 97.25%, with an
improvement of 12.14%.
4.4 Threats to Validity
In the following, we describe the main threats to validity of
our approach in detail.
Internal validity: During the experimental process, the
data set used to train AEG is manually divided into two
data domains, which may lead to subjective differences. To
mitigate this threat, after the data domain is divided, we
asked three observers to randomly exchange the examples
of the two data domains, and three selected observers
complete independently. In addition, we pre-train with the
initial data domains and then retrain with the data domains
adjusted by other observers.
External validity: During the experimental process, the
classification of experimental data set is limited, which may
lead to the reduction of the generality of the approach to a
certain extent. To solve this problem, we use a cross-data set
approach to validate the generalization performance of the
approach.
Conclusion validity: According to the designed three
problems, we can validate our approach. To further ensure
the validity of the conclusion, we validated the conclusion
through the valid data sets and models from other re-
searchers, and reached the same conclusion as the standard
data set.
5 RELATED WORK
In this section, we review the most relevant work in three
aspects. Section 5.1 introduces the adversarial deep learn-
ing and some adversarial examples generation approaches.
Section 5.2 elaborates coverage-guided fuzz testing of tra-
ditional software. Section 5.3 introduces the state-of-the-art
testing approaches of DL systems.
5.1 Adversarial Deep Learning
A large number of recent research has shown that adversar-
ial examples with small perturbations poses a great threat
to the security and robustness of DL systems [19], [36], [37],
[38]. Small perturbations to the input images can fool the
whole DL systems, and the input image is initially classified
correctly by the DL systems. Although in human eyes, the
modified adversarial example is obviously indistinguish-
able from the original example.
Goodfellow et al. [18] proposed FGSM (Fast Gradient
Sign Method) which can craft adversarial examples using
loss function J(θ, x, y) with respect to the input feature vec-
tor, where θ denotes the model parameters, x is the input,
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, VOL. XX, NO. X, XXXX 14
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Retrain_epoch
0.9880
0.9885
0.9890
0.9895
0.9900
0.9905
Ac
cu
ra
cy
CAGFuzz
DeepXplore
FGSM
DeepHunter
(a) LeNet-1
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Retrain_epoch
0.9896
0.9898
0.9900
0.9902
0.9904
0.9906
0.9908
0.9910
Ac
cu
ra
cy
CAGFuzz
DeepXplore
FGSM
DeepHunter
(b) LeNet-4
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Retrain_epoch
0.9955
0.9960
0.9965
0.9970
0.9975
0.9980
0.9985
Ac
cu
ra
cy
CAGFuzz
DeepXplore
FGSM
DeepHunter
(c) LeNet-5
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Retrain_epoch
0.862
0.864
0.866
0.868
0.870
0.872
0.874
0.876
Ac
cu
ra
cy
CAGFuzz
DeepXplore
FGSM
DeepHunter
(d) VGG-16
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Retrain_epoch
0.74
0.75
0.76
0.77
0.78
Ac
cu
ra
cy
CAGFuzz
DeepXplore
FGSM
DeepHunter
(e) VGG-19
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Retrain_epoch
0.830
0.832
0.834
0.836
0.838
Ac
cu
ra
cy
CAGFuzz
DeepXplore
FGSM
DeepHunter
(f) ResNet-20
Fig. 11. Improvement in accuracy of DNN models when the training set is augmented with the same number of inputs generated by FGSM,
DeepXplore, DeepHunter and CAGFuzz .
and y is the output label of x. The adversarial example is
generated as: x
′
= x+sign(OxJ(θ, x, y)). In this paper, we
choose FGSM as a baseline. The FGSM approach uses the
gradient change of specific DNN to generate adversarial ex-
amples. Consequently, the generated adversarial examples
have good defect detection ability for the specific DNN.
However, the approach cannot achieve good performance
when it is extended to other DNNs.
Papernot et al. [39] proposed JSMA (Jacobian-based
Saliency Map Attack) to craft adversarial examples based
on a precise understanding of the mapping between inputs
and outputs of DNNs. For an input x and a neural network
N , the output of class j is denoted as Nj(x). To achieve a
target misclassification class t, Nt(x) is increased while the
probabilities Nj(x) of all other classes j 6= t decrease, until
t = argmaxjNj(x).
Kurakin et al. [40] proposed BIM (Basic Iterative
method). They apply it multiple times with small step size,
and clip pixel values of intermediate results after each step
to ensure that they are in an -neighbourhood of the original
image. The method applies adversarial noise η many times
iteratively with a small parameter , rather than one η with
one  at a time, which gives a recursive formula: x
′
0 = x
and x
′
i = clipx,(x
′
i−1 + sign(Ox′i−1J(θ, x
′
i−1, y)), where
clipx,(.) denotes a clipping of the values of the adversarial
example such that they are within an -neighborhood of the
original input x.
Carlini et al. [41] proposed CW (Carlini and Wagner
Attacks), a new optimization-based attack technique which
is arguably the most effective in terms of the adversarial suc-
cess rates achieved with minimal perturbation. In principle,
the CW attack is to approximate the solution to the follow-
ing optimization problem: argminx′λL(x, x
′
)− J(θ, x′ , y),
where L is a loss function to measure the distance between
the prediction and the ground truth, and the constant λ is to
balance the two loss contributions.
At present, these approaches are not used for testing
deep learning systems. We find that it is meaningful to
apply them to the steps of example generation in deep
learning test. However, all these approaches only attempt
to find a specific kind of error behavior, that is, to force
incorrect prediction by adding minimum noise to a given
example. In this way, these approaches are designed for
special DNNs, and the generated adversarial examples have
low generalization ability. In contrast, our approach does
not depend on a specific DNN, and uses the distribution of
general data domains to learn from each other, so as to add
small perturbations to the original examples.
5.2 Coverage-Guided Fuzzing Testing
Coverage-guided fuzzing testing (CGF) [42] is a mature
defect and vulnerability detection technology. A typical CGF
usually performs the following loops: 1) selecting seeds
from the seed pool; 2) mutating seeds for a certain number
of times to generate new tests using bit/byte flip, block
substitution, and crossover of two seed files; 3) running the
target program for the newly generated input and record-
ing the execution trajectory; 4) if the detection is made in
example of collapse, the fault seeds are reported and the
interesting seeds covered with new traces are stored in the
seed pool.
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Superion [43] conceptually extends LangFuzz [44] with
coverage-guided: the seeds of structural mutation that in-
crease coverage are retained to further fuzzing. While Su-
perion works well for highly structured inputs such as
XML and JavaScript, AFLSMART’s variation operators bet-
ter support block based file formats such as image and audio
files.
Zest [45] and libprotobuf mutator [46] have been pro-
posed to improve the mutation quality by providing struc-
ture aware mutation strategies. Zest compiles the syntax
specification into a fuzzer driver stub for the coverage-
guided greybox fuzzer. This fuzzer driver translates byte-
level mutations of LibFuzzer [27] into structural mutations
of the fuzzer target.
NEZHA [47] is used to focus on inputs that are more
likely to trigger logic errors by using behavioral asym-
metries between test programs. The behavior consistency
between different implementations acts as Oracle to detect
functional defects.
TensorFuzz [48] is good at automatically discovering er-
rors that only a few examples can cause. For example, it
can find the numerical error in the trained neural network,
generate the difference between the neural network and
its quantized version, and find the bad behavior in the
character level language model. However, the defects of
TensorFuzz are as follows. First, TensorFuzz directly adds
noise to the examples, so it is unnatural to generate exam-
ples, while CAGFuzz uses AEG to mutate the examples first
and then to restore them; thus, in CAGFuzz the generated
adversarial examples are more natural and understandable
for humans. Second, TensorFuzz does not consider the deep
feature while CAGFuzz uses deep feature to constrain the
adversarial examples; this enables us to ensure that the high-
level semantics of the examples remain unchanged.
The validity of DLFuzz [14] shows that it is feasible to
apply the fuzzy knowledge to DL testing, which can greatly
improve the performance of existing DL testing technologies
such as DeepXplore [10]. Gradient-based optimization prob-
lem solution ensures simple deployment and high efficiency
of the framework. The mechanism of seed maintenance
provides different directions and more space for improving
the coverage of neurons.
Due to the inherent difference between DL systems
and traditional software, traditional CGF cannot be directly
applied to DL systems. In our approach, CGF is adopted to
be suitable for DL systems. The state-of-the-art CGF mainly
consists of three parts: mutation, feedback guidance, and
fuzzing strategy, in which we replace mutation with the
adversarial example generator trained by CycleGAN. In the
feedback part, neuron coverage is used as the guideline. In
the fuzzy strategy part, because the test is basically input
by the same format of images, the adversarial examples
generated with higher coverage are selected and put into
the processing pool to maximize the neuron coverage of the
target DL systems.
5.3 Testing of DL Systems
In traditional software testing, the main idea of evaluating
machine learning systems and deep learning systems is
to randomly extract test examples from manually labeled
datasets [49] and hoc simulations [50] to measure their
accuracy. In some special cases, such as autopilot, special
non-guided simulations are used. However, without under-
standing the internal mechanism of models, such black-box
test paradigms cannot find different situations that may lead
to unexpected behavior [10], [51].
DeepXplore [10] proposes a white-box differential testing
technique for generating test inputs that may trigger in-
consistencies between different DNNs, which may identify
incorrect behavior. For the first time, this method introduced
concept of neuron coverage as a metric of DL testing.
At the same time, it requires multiple DL systems with
functions similar to cross-reference prediction to avoid man-
ual checking. However, cross-references have difficulties in
finding DL-like systems. DeepXplore is similar to FGSM in
that it is also based on the given DNN model to generate
adversarial examples, whose generalization ability is not
good. Furthermore, through our experiments, we found that
DeepXplore has a poor ability on finding potential errors
in the model. The reason may be that DeepXplore does not
use any constraints to control the generation of adversarial
examples. In contrast, our approach, CAGFuzz uses AEG to
generate adversarial examples based on a given data set.
Experiments show that the generalization ability of these
adversarial examples is better. In addition, we use deep
feature to constrain the generation of adversarial examples,
which has a good effect in finding potential errors of the
model.
DeepHunter [11] performs mutations to generate new se-
mantic retention tests, and uses multiple pluggable coverage
criteria as feedback to guide test generation from different
perspectives. Similar to traditional coverage-guided fuzzy
(CGF) testing [52], [53], DeepHunter uses random mutations
to generate new test examples. Although there is a screening
mechanism to filter invalid use examples, it still wastes
time and computing resources. DeepHunter uses pixel value
transformation (change image contrast, image brightness,
image blur and image noise) and affine transformation (im-
age translation, image scaling, image shearing, and image
rotation) to mutate the image. The examples generated by
these image transformations are unnatural, and the human
eye can clearly see the components of “fraud”. In addition,
DeepHunter uses pixel level constraints when keep valid
examples, which are the low-level features of the image.
When testing the model with deeper layers, the test ef-
fect is not good. In contrast, in CAGFuzz, AEG generates
adversarial examples by adding small perturbations to the
original examples that are not visible to the human eye, and
the adversarial examples generated by AEG are natural and
more confusing to the model. At the same time, the deep
features are used in CAGFuzz to constrain the adversarial
examples, and consequently the adversarial examples have
effective test effect on the model with deep layers.
DeepTest [17] performs a tool for automated testing of
DNN-driven autonomous cars. DeepTest does not consider
the small perturbations on input examples and however
maximizes the neuron coverage of a DNN using synthetic
test images generated by applying different real transfor-
mations to a set of seed images. The image transformation
method of DeepTest is the affine transformation (image trans-
lation, image scaling, image shearing and image rotation) in
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DeepHunter. Therefore, DeepTest has the similar problem as
DeepHunter.
In addition, many testing approaches for traditional
software have also been adopted and applied to testing DL
systems, such as MC/DC coverage [15], concolic test [54],
combinatorial test [55] and mutation test [56]. Furthermore,
various forms of neuron coverage [16] have been defined,
and are demonstrated as important metrics to guide test
generation. In general, these approaches do not consider ad-
versarial examples and test DL systems from other aspects.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE
WORK
We design and implement CAGFuzz, a coverage-guided
adversarial generative fuzzing testing approach. CAGFuzz
trains an adversarial example generator for a specified
dataset. It generates adversarial examples for target DNN by
iteratively taking original examples, generating adversarial
examples and feedback of coverage rate, and finds potential
defects in the development and deployment phase of DNN.
We have done a lot of experiments to prove the effectiveness
of CAGFuzz in promoting DNN coverage, discovering po-
tential errors in DNN and improving model accuracy. The
goal of CAGFuzz is to maximize the neuron coverage and
the number of potential erroneous behaviors. The experi-
mental results show that CAGFuzz can detect thousands of
erroneous behaviors in advanced DNN models, which are
trained on publicly popular datasets.
Several directions for future work are possible.
• At present, we only use neuron coverage to guide
the generation of adversarial examples. Neuron cov-
erage may not cover all the logic of DNN effectively.
In the future, we can use multidimensional coverage
feedback to improve the information that adversarial
examples can cover.
• CAGFuzz adds perturbation information to the origi-
nal example by mapping between two data domains.
These perturbations are uncontrollable. In the future,
the perturbation information can be added to the
original example by feature control.
• This paper mainly studies image examples, and how
to train effective adversarial example generator for
other input forms, such as text information and voice
information, is also a meaningful direction.
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